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A Return to Normalcy
Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hospital'
"[Elveryone is really responsible to all men for all man and for everything."2
Dostoyevsky
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to establish liability in most tort actions, a plaintiff must show
that the defendant "caused" the injury or harm in question Not only must
the defendant's conduct be the "cause-in-fact" of the harm, but it also must be
the "proximate cause" of the plaintiffs harm.' This Note focuses on the
cause-in-fact requirement discussed in the Missouri Supreme Court case,
Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hospital. In Callahan, the court dispelled
much of the confusion that has plagued Missouri cause-in-fact analysis.' The
court clearly expounded the test for cause-in-fact questions.7 Furthermore,
the court explained the exception to the basic test, and clarified Missouri law
regarding this essential element of tort liability.
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
In Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hospital, Daniel Callahan ("Danny")
and his parents filed a medical malpractice suit against Cardinal Glennon
Hospital ("Cardinal Glennon") and St. Louis University On November 4,
1978, when Danny was about three months old, he received the live polio
1. 863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1993).
2. FYoDoR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 344 (Modem Library
College ed. 1950) cited in ARNo C. BECHT & FRANK W. NMILR, THE TEST OF
FACTUAL CAUSATION INNEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILiTY CASES 25 n.36 (1961).
3. Rosev. Thompson, 141 S.W.2d 824, 828 (Mo. 1940) (citing Shunk v. Harvey,
223 S.W. 1066, 1068 (Mo. 1920)).
4. Branstetter v. Gerdeman, 274 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Mo. 1955).
5. 863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1993).
6. See infra notes 125-35 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
8. Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 857.
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vaccine, Orimune' On November 30, 1978 his mother discovered a red spot
on his perineum, the area between the anus and the genitalia." Two days
later, after the red spot developed into a boil and Danny began running a
fever, his parents took him to Cardinal Glennon." On this initial visit to the
hospital, Danny was first examined by nurse Williams, and then by a pediatric
nurse practitioner, Debra Schwarz." Schwarz diagnosed the boil as a
perirectal abscess, determined that Danny's fever was caused by this abscess,
and prescribed the antibiotic Oxycillin as treatment. 3 Furthermore, she
instructed Danny's parents to soak the boil in warm water, treat the fever with
Tylenol, and take Danny to see his pediatrician, Dr. Fetick, on the following
Monday. 4
During this visit, no cultures were taken of the abscess to determine
whether it contained gram positive or gram negative bacteria." Danny's
mother testified that no one but nurse Williams and nurse Schwarz examined
Danny. 6 Dr. Venglarcik, the supervising physician at the time of Danny's
initial examination, testified that although he did not remember examining
Danny, his signature appeared on Danny's chart.17
Danny's parents administered the treatment as instructed and, except for
the onset of vomiting, the child's condition remained unchanged." On
Monday, December4, 1978, Mrs. Callahan and Danny visited Dr. Fetick, who
examined the abscess and advised Mrs. Callahan to keep Danny on the
hospital's recommended regimen.' The next day, Danny's parents noticed
that his legs appeared to be floppy, and Mr. Callahan called Cardinal Glennon
9. Id. at 856.
10. Id. at 857.
11. Id.
12. Id. A pediatric nurse practitioner is "a registered nurse with special skills in
assessing the physical and psychological status of [pediatric] patients." STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1073 (25th ed. 1990).
13. Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 857. A perirectal abscess is an abscess adjacent to
the rectum. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1169 (25th ed. 1990).
14. Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 857.
15. Id. Bacteria are either gram positive or gram negative. The antibiotic
Oxycillin is only effective for gram positive, not gram negative bacteria. Id.
16. Id.
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to explain his son's condition.2" He was informed that babies with fever are
less active and Danny did not need to come to the hospital."'
The next morning, when Danny's legs remained floppy and his eyes
began to roll back into his head, Mrs. Callahan again took Danny to Cardinal
Glennon, where physicians determined that Danny's legs and left arm were
paralyzed.22 A physician incised and drained the abscess, and cultures
showed that four types of gram negative bacteria were present.2 Despite
treatment, Danny's arm and legs remained paralyzed and he was diagnosed as
a permanent triplegic.24
At trial, the plaintiff's two expert witnesses testified that St. Louis
University and Cardinal Glennon negligently caused Danny's paralysis.'
They theorized that the gram negative organisms released endotoxins that
suppressed Danny's immune system and made him susceptible to the live
polio in the Orimune vaccine he received. Furthermore, the experts
testified that if the abscess had been incised and drained as it should have
been on Danny's first visit to the hospital, the correct antibiotic would have
been prescribed. As a result his immune system would not have been
suppressed, and Danny would not have acquired poliomyelitis, paralytic
polioY
Some of the defendants' experts contested this theory and presented
evidence that in rare instances, children develop vaccine-induced polio."
One expert, Dr. Schwartz, testified that during the 1980s approximately one
in 400,000 people receiving the polio vaccine for the first time developed
polio.29 The defendants produced evidence to show that Danny's symptoms
were consistent with such rare cases.30
The jury found for the plaintiff, Daniel Callahan, and awarded him $16
million in compensatory damages.3 Cardinal Glennon entered into a








27. Id. at 858.
28. Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., No. 60685, 1992 WL 251555, at *2
(Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1992).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at *3.
1994]
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the Eastern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals. 2 In addition to seven
other points of error, St. Louis University alleged that the plaintiff had failed
to present sufficient evidence of causation. Finding that the plaintiff had
presented enough evidence to satisfy the substantial factor test for causation,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.34 Subsequently, the Missouri
Supreme Court granted transfer?
3
In the process of affirming the trial court's judgment, the Missouri
Supreme Court sought to clarify the perceived confusion in Missouri causation
analysis.36 Overruling in part its decision in Jackson v. Ray Kruse
Construction Co.,3 7 the court held the "but-for" test for causation applies in
all tort cases, with one narrow exception."8 In cases that involve two
independent torts, each sufficient by itself to cause the injury, the "but for"
test will not apply.39 Instead, the substantial factor test for causation will be
utilized.40
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Causation: Terminology and Definitions
Whether the theory of liability is negligence, products liability, strict liability,
or intentional tort, the element of causation is essential to any tort plaintiff's
prima facie case.41 Indeed, "[i]t would be obviously opposed to any possible
conception of justice that any one should be required to answer for a harm
32. Id.
33. Id. at *1.
34. Id. at *6.
35. Id.
36. Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 860-63.
37. 708 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. 1986).
38. Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 862-63.
39. Id. at 861.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., MAI 17.01 [1980 Revision] (providing that "[y]our verdict must be
for plaintiff if you believe ... as a direct result of such negligence plaintiff sustained
damage."); MAI 19.01 [1986 Revision] (providing that "such negligence directly
caused or directly contributed to cause damage to plaintiff."); MAI 23.02 [1990
Revision] (providing that "defendant thereby caused plaintiff bodily harm."); MAI
25.04 [1978 Revision] (providing that "plaintiff was damaged as a direct result of such
defective condition."). Note that the terms "direct result" and "directly cause" refer to
the element of causation. Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 863.
[Vol, 59
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unless he had actually caused it."42 While this principle may seem to be
rooted in common sense,43 determining "cause," in the legal sense, is often
a very complex proposition.
The initial hurdle that one must overcome in understanding tort causation
is the terminology. Despite attempts to clarify the wording, uncertainty and
confusion abound in "the legal use of causal language. "'4 The words cause,
causation, cause-in-fact, proximate cause, and legal cause are not standard
referents but are fluid concepts that have different meanings for different
individuals.45
Legal scholars often begin explanations of causation by attempting to
differentiate the legal definitions from the philosophic definitions of cause. 6
In a philosophic sense, the cause of an event is the "sum of all [its]
antecedents."'47 Every event has causes that reach back to the beginning of
time, and no one occurrence can be said to be the cause of an event.4"
However, the philosophical definition of cause is rather useless for legal
analysis, as it would impose "infinite liability for all wrongful acts, and would
'set society on edge and fill the courts with endless litigation."'49  Thus,
42. Francis H. Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARV. L. REV. 233, 234
(1908) (emphasis added).
43. See Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 862 ("Any attempt to find liability absent actual
causation is an attempt to connect the defendant with an injury or event that the
defendant had nothing to do with. Mere logic and common sense dictates that there
be some causal relationship between the defendant's conduct and the injury or event
for which damages are sought.").
44. H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORE, CAUSATION mr THE LAW 1 (1959).
45. "[R]ules of legal cause have been seen as no more than linguistic devices that
courts manipulate to explain results suiting their fancy." ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL
CAUSE iN THE LAW OF TORTS viii (1963).
46. See, e.g., BECHT & MILLER, supra note 2, at 1; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND IEETON ON THE LAW oF TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984); Jeremiah
Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARv. L. REv. 103, 104 (1911).
47. Smith, supranote 46, at 104 (citing JoHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC
378-83 (9th Eng. ed. 1956) (1852)).
48. BEcrr & MULEP, supra note 2, at 12; 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEmNG
JAMES, JR., THE LAW oF TORTS § 20.2, at 1110 (1956).
49. KEETON ET AL., supra note 46, at 264 (quoting North v. Johnson, 59 N.W.
1012 (Minn. 1894)). As Judge Andrews stated:
[a]ny philosophical doctrine of causation does not help us. A boy throws
a stone into a pond. The ripples spread. The water level rises. The history
of that pond is altered for all eternity. It will be altered by other causes
,lso. Yet it will be forever the resultant of all causes combined. Each one
will have an influence.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928).
1994]
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courts have avoided any such notions of cause." Despite the legal rejection
of philosophic definitions of cause, such principles provide insight into legal
doctrines of causation.
In a tort cause of action, in order to prove a causal connection between
an allegedly tortious act and an injury, one must show two things:
(1) causation-in-fact and (2) proximate cause. 1 These two components are
often referred to, collectively, as "causation."52 Causation-in-fact, the factual
component of causation, is defined as that which "produces an event and
without which the event would not have occurred." 3 In other words, the
defendant's conduct will be considered a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's harm
if it produced the harm and if, in the absence of defendant's conduct, the harm
would not have resulted. 4 The legal component of causation, referred to as
proximate cause (or legal cause), limits legal responsibility "to those causes
[-in-fact] which are so closely connected with the result and of such
significance that the law is justified in imposing liability."55 Determinations
of proximate cause involve notions of public policy, justice, and convenience,
and through this doctrine "the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of
events beyond a certain point."56 This Note focuses on cause-in-fact
analysis.57
50. See Smith, supra note 46, at 104 (stating that this "view canriot be adopted
as a working rule by courts" because "no tortfeasor would be regarded as the cause of
any damage.").
51. Koerber v. Alendo Bldg. Co., 846 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)
(citing Branstetter v. Gerdeman, 274 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Mo. 1955)).
52. See Koerber, 846 S.W.2d at 730 n.3 (stating that some courts refer to
causation as including causation-in-fact and proximate cause).
53. BLACK'S LAW DIcrIoNAPY 221 (6th ed. 1990).
54. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 46, at 265-66.
55. KEETON ET AL., supranote 46, at 264. Proximate cause is necessary in order
to limit the potentiallyinfinite liability possibilities of cause-in-fact. Id. See Callahan,
863 S.W.2d at 865 (stating that "[p]roximate cause requires something in addition to
a 'but for' causation test because the 'but for' causation test serves only to exclude
items that are not causal in fact; it will include items that are causal in fact but that
would be unreasonable to base liability upon because they are too far removed from
the ultimate injury or damage. For example, carried to the ridiculous, 'but for' the
mother and father of the defendant conceiving the defendant bringing him into their
world, the accident would not have happened.").
56. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
57. Note that some courts use the.termi "proximate cause" to refer to both cause-
in-fact and proximate cause.
[Vol. 59
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B. Cause-In-Fact: Historical Tests
Historically, common law courts have utilized two primary tests in
determining whether or not one's conduct should be characterized as a cause-
in-fact of the harm. These tests are the "but for" (or sine qua non) test and
the "substantial factor" test." The former has ancient roots, while the latter
was created in the early twentieth century. 9
The but-for test states that the defendant's conduct may be characterized
as a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's harm if, but for the commission of
defendant's acts, the damage would not have happened." In short, the but-
for test is a test for necessary causes.61 At early common law, satisfying the
but-for test was thought to be both necessary and sufficient in establishing a
causal connection in a tort action.62 However, courts now employ proximate
cause analysis in addition to cause-in-fact analysis.63
Missouri courts have historically applied the but-for test in order to
determine questions of causation-in-fact.' Articulating the test, the Missouri
58. KEETON ET AL., supra note 46, at 265-68.
59. See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text; see also Smith, supra note 46,
at 109 n.22 (stating that "[a]t an early day the 'but for' rule prevailed").
60. BECHT & MLLER, supra note 2, at 13 (noting that in using the but for test,
one must set up hypothetical situations, or "parallel series," in order to test the
proposition that if X would not have happened then, the result Y would not have
occurred). Some would equate but for cause with the philosophic definition of cause.
This, however, was rejected by Becht and Miller. See BECHT & MILLER, supra note
2, at 25-26.
61. BECHT & MILLER, supra note 2, at 15.
62. See Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, supra note 42, at 234-35 ("The
primitive conception of a sufficient legal cause was a causa sine qua non."). "[B]ut
if [cause-in-fact] stood alone the scope of liability would be vast indeed, for 'the
causes of causes [are] infinite'-'the fatal trespass done by Eve was cause of all our
woe'.... To be sure [proximate cause] is only one of the devices used to limit the
fact and the extent of liability for negligence." HARPER & JAMEIS, supra note 48, at
1108.
63. See supranotes 55-56 and accompanying text. Legal scholars have attacked
the but-for test for various reasons. Becht & Miller opine that the test has "many
shortcomings unless it is used with great care." BECHT & MILLER, supra note 2, at
15. They assert the but-for test only detects necessary causes as of the time the test
is applied, and that the test gives different answers depending on the degree of detail
with which the facts, whose causes are all being investigated, are described. BEcHT
& MILLER, supra note 2, at 15-16. Furthermore, they claim the but-for test is
incapable of distinguishing between causes the defendant could have prevented and
those he could not have presented. BECHT & MILLER, supra note 2, at 18.
64. This use of the but-for test in Missouri can be traced from the nineteenth
century up to the present day. See Reed v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 50 Mo. App. 504, 506
1994]
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Supreme Court stated that "[a] causal connection must be established between
the negligence charged or submitted and the loss or injury sustained, such that
the injury would not have happened but for the negligence, and also that the
negligence was not only a cause but was a proximate cause."65
However, courts soon discovered that the but-for test contains one
inherent flaw.66 This flaw manifests itself in a fact situation where two or
more independent torts, each individually capable of creating the harm in
question, concurrently produce the injury. Many call such a situation a
"two fires" case, after a line of decisions including Kingston v. Chicago & N.
W. Railway Co.,6s in which a fire negligently started by the defendant
merged with an equally strong fire of unknown origin, subsequently damaging
plaintiff's property. 9 Using the but-for test in such a case would produce
absurd results. For example, assuming there are two identifiable defendants,
each one could plead the other's negligence and argue that but for defendant's
negligence, the harm still would have occurred."0 In effect, neither defendant
would be the but-for cause, and both wrongdoers would escape liability."
Recognizing that such results would "make a wrongdoer a favorite of the law,"
the Kingston court held the defendant liable for the damages. 2
(Mo. Ct. App. 1892); Dickson v. Omaha & St. Louis Ry., 27 S.W. 476, 478 (Mo.
1894); Plefka v. Knapp, Stout & Co., 46 S.W. 974, 975 (Mo. 1898); Kane v. Missouri
Pac. Ry., 157 S.W. 644, 648 (Mo. 1913); Coble v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 38
S.W.2d 1031, 1036 (Mo. 1931); Kimberling v. WabashRy., 85 S.W.2d736, 741 (Mo.
1935); Branstetter v. Gerdeman, 274 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Mo. 1955).
65. Branstetter, 274 S.W.2d at 245 (emphasis added).
66. KEETON ET AL., supra note 46, at 266.
67. KEETON ET AL., supra note 46, at 266.
68. 211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927). See Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste.
M. Ry., 179 N.W. 45, 49 (Minn. 1920) (applying a rule that if defendant's negligence
was a material element, i.e., substantial factor, defendant would be held liable, despite
that defendant's negligence concurred with another unknown force to produce the
harm). See also Cook v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 74 N.W. 561, 566
(Wis. 1898) (holding that the railroad which set one fire was not liable for the
damages by the united fires because the origin of the other fire was not identified, and
implying that if both fires had been of known responsible origin, each wrongdoer
would be liable for the entire damage). On identical facts, the Anderson court
repudiated the Cookrule that liability cannot attach to the defendant if one fire was of
natural origin. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 48, at 1123 n.7.
69. Kingston, 211 N.W. at 914.
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Sixteen years prior to Kingston, Jeremiah Smith, in Legal Cause in
Actions of Tort,3 addressed the two fires problem in but-for analysis.74
Smith found such situation to be an exception to the but-for test,75 stating
that "[t]he defendant's tort must be distinctly traceable as one of the
substantial efficient antecedents; as having had a substantial share in subjecting
plaintiff to the damage."76 However, instead of recognizing the two fires
situation as an exception to the but-for test, courts used this language to
fashion an entirely new test, the substantial factor test, for causation-in-fact.77
In its original form, the substantial factor test stated that the defendant's
conduct should be found to be a cause-in-fact of the resulting harm if the
conduct was a material element or a substantial factor in bringing about the
harm.7" For example, in the Kingston case, one would test for causation-in-
fact by asking whether the defendant's fire was a substantial factor in
destroying the plaintiff's property. If the defendant's fire was a small brush
fire that merged with a raging forest fire, a jury could conclude that the
defendant's fire was not a substantial factor and free the defendant from
liability.7
9
While courts originally formulated this substantial factor test for the
narrow purpose of dealing with "two fires" problems, it was eventually applied
much more broadly, largely due to the Restatement of Torts' application of the
test.s In 1934, the Restatement adopted the following substantial factor test
in section 431, which applies to all causation questions:
The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of hann to another if (a) his
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is
no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in
which his negligence has resulted in the harm.
73. Smith, supra note 46.
74. Smith, supra note 76, at 109.
75. Smith, supra note 76, at 109 n.20.
76. Smith, supra note 76, at 109.
77. KEETON ET AL., supra note 46, at 267-68.
78. KEETON ET AL., supra note 46, at 267.
79. See Kingston, 211 N.W. at 915 ("It is also conceivable that a fire so set might
unite with a fire of so much greater proportions, such as a raging forest fire, so as to
be enveloped or swallowed up by the greater holocaust, and its identity destroyed, so
that the greater fire could be said to be an intervening or superseding cause."). One
would reach the same result as the Kingston court by using the substantial factor test,
as opposed to intervening cause analysis.
80. Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 861.
81. RESTATEmENT OF TORTS § 431 (1934) (emphasis added).
1994]
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The Comment to this section reads: "[t]he word 'substantial' is used to denote
the fact that the defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the harm
as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause . ."' Read alone, this
appears to displace the but-for test completely. However, section 432 of the
Restatement clearly retains the but-for test. Section 432 states:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the actor's negligent conduct is not
a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another if it would have been
sustained even if the actor had not been negligent.
(2) If two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor's
negligence, the other not because of any misconduct on his part, and each
of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the actor's negligence
may be held by the jury to be a substantial factor in bringing it about.'
Therefore, after 1934, a conflict in terminology existed. The term
substantial factor could either mean the narrow test developed to deal with a
shortcoming in the but-for test, or it could mean, in the much broader sense
of the Restatement, a test to determine all causation-in-fact problems."
Prosser adopted the former meaning, stating that the "substantial-factor rule
was developed primarily for cases in which application of the but-for rule
would allow each defendant to escape responsibility because the conduct of
one or more others would have been sufficient to produce the same result."85
In contrast, Missouri courts opted for the latter meaning of substantial
factor.8
6
82. Id. at cmt. a.
83. Id. § 432. Note that Subsection (1) requires defendant's conduct to be a "but
for" cause before it could be considered a substantial factor. Subsection (2) recognizes
the "two fires" problem and grants an exception to Subsection (1). Sections 431 and
432 are identical in the First and Second editions of the Restatement of Torts. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431-432 (1965).
84. Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 861.
85. KEETON ET AL., supra note 46, at 268. Prosser recommended an alternative
to substantial factor which would be an exception to the but for rule. "When the
conduct of two or more actors is so related to an event that their combined conduct,
viewed as a whole, is a but-for cause of the event, and application of the but-for rule
to them individually would absolve all of them, the conduct of each is a cause in fact
of the event." KEETON ET AL., supra note 46, at 268.
86. See infra notes 91-94.
[Vol. 59
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C. Missouri Cause-In-Fact Testing
Prior to the creation of substantial factor testing, Missouri courts utilized
but-for analysis.' However, in Giles v. Moundridge Milling Co.,' the
Missouri Supreme Court stated that the but-for test applied and then quoted
favorably from Restatement sections 431 and 432.' 9 Then in the 1972 case
Ricketts v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co.,90 the court announced that "Missouri
[had] adopted the Restatement standard that actionable negligence must be a
substantial factor."91
After adoption of the broad substantial factor test, Missouri courts applied
it inconsistently. Some courts implemented the but-for test without
mentioning substantial factor terminology;' other courts reiterated the
Restatement substantial factor test without using but-for terminology.'
In Jackson v. Ray Kruse Construction Co.,94 the Missouri Supreme
Court embarked on a novel excursion into causation-in-fact rules when it
intimated that the substantial factor test did not include a but-for analysis.95
In Ricketts, the Missouri Supreme Court had adopted the Restatement
substantial factor test, which, by definition, incorporates a but-for analysis.96
87. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
88. 173 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1943).
89. Id. at 750. It is unclear whether the Giles court adopted the Restatement
"substantial factor" test. The court first found that the applicable test was but for
citing a previous Missouri case and RESTATvMENT OF TORTS § 432(1). Then, the
court quoted from § 431 and stated that "[tihat is the American Law Institute's
definition of legal or proximate cause." Finally, the court quoted from § 432(2). Id.
Nowhere did the court hold that this is the Missouri test.
90. 484 S.W.2d 216 (Mo. 1972).
91. Ricketts v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 484 S.W.2d 216, 222 (Mo. 1972)
(citing Bean v. Ross Mfg. Co., 344 S.W.2d 18, 28 (Mo. 1961)). The Ricketts court
provides rather unpersuasive authority for the proposition that Missouri had adopted
the Restatement substantial factor test. Although it cites Bean, the Bean court applied
Illinois law, and did not mention that this was the test in Missouri.
92. See, e.g., Hills v. Ozark Border Elec. Coop., 710 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986) (Southern District); Delisiv. St. Luke's Episcopal-Presbyterian Hosp., 701
S.W.2d 170, 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (Eastern District); Robbins v. Jewish Hosp.,
663 S.W.2d 341, 345 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (Eastern District).
93. See, e.g., Metzger v. Schermesser, 687 S.W.2d 671, 672-73 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985) (Eastern District); Searcy v. Neal, 509 S.W.2d 755, 762 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974)
(Kansas City District).
94. 708 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. 1986).
95. Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 861.
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Therefore, when the court implied that but-for testing was not necessary, it
misapplied and misunderstood its own precedent.'
In Jackson, twelve-year-old plaintiff and accident victim Kimberly Ann
Jackson brought suit against the owner and operator of the parking lot adjacent
to the apartment building where Kimberly and her parents lived.98 Kimberly
alleged that because of the defendant's failure to maintain the parking lot in
a reasonably safe condition, she sustained injuries when a bicyclist collided
with her while she stood in the lot.99 The plaintiff's expert witness
maintained that speed bumps should have been installed so as to slow the
speed of vehicles on the parking lot and that such speed bumps are standard
safety devices.' In addition, the evidence showed that children often rode
their bikes down the parking lot hill at high speeds and complaints had been
made about such conduct.10'
The court concluded that "the jury could have believed" that the
recommended speed bumps "could have greatly reduced the chance of an
accident, either by slowing down the bicycle or shifting its direction."1"
However, the court did not state that if the speedbumps had been installed, the
accident would not have occurred. Finding its conclusion consistent with the
substantial factor test, the court reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of
the defendant. 03
Judges Donnelly, Welliver, and Robertson filed separate dissenting
opinions in Jackson.' Judge Donnelly found the evidence did not support
the inference that plaintiffs injuries would not have occurred but for the
failure to install speed bumps.0 5 Furthermore, citing the Restatement of
Torts (Second) section 432(1), he stated that even the substantial factor test
requires overcoming the but-for hurdle.0 6 Concluding his arguments, Judge
97. See supra notes 86, 94 and accompanying text.
98. Jackson, 708 S.W.2d at 665.
99. Id. at 665-66.
100. Id. at 666.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 668.
103. Id. at 669.
104. Id. at 670-77.
105. Id. at 671 (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
106. Id. Judge Donnelly also found that the substantial factor testwas "developed
as a framework for analysis for the relatively infrequent situation in which two causes
concur to bring about an event and either one of them, operating alone, would have
been sufficient to cause the plaintiffs injury. PRossER & KEETON ON ToRTs, 268
(5th ed. 1984)." Id. In a footnote, the majority disputed this characterization of the
substantial factor test: "We do not agree .... The substantial factor test, rather, was
intended to demonstrate that the precipitating cause (here the actions of the cyclist) is
not necessarily the only legally sufficient cause. A cause which meets the substantial
[Vol. 59
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Donnelly poignantly stated that "[it must be obvious to those who care that
the majority is bent on making the need for compensation the overwhelming
function of the law of torts in Missouri.1
107
Judge Welliver characterized the majority opinion as one that "abdicates
the judicial function of deciding as a matter of law whether the case should
have been submitted to the jury." '  However, he opined that duty, not
causation, was the central issue of the case, and that the scope of defendant's
duty did not involve placing speed bumps in the parking lot.1"9 Finally,
Judge Robertson squarely asserted that there existed no evidence to refute the
conclusion that even if speed bumps had been installed, this accident would
still have occurred.110
With the Jackson decision, the court effectively relaxed the requirements
of causation-in-fact.1 Missouri courts of appeals interpreted the language
of the majority in Jackson as doing away with the but-for requirement."'
For instance, in Schneider v. Union Electric Co.," 3 the court stated that the
jury could have found that implementing safety precautions would have
"greatly reduced the chance of an accident.""' 4 The court did not discuss
whether the accidentwould still have occurred if the safety measures had been
provided. Similarly, in Goffv. St. Luke's Hospital,' the Missouri Supreme
Court's opinion was similarly devoid of any but-for analysis.16 After
mentioning that the plaintiffs witnesses had testified the lack of red blood
cells in the plaintiff's husband "contributed to" and was "a major cause of
death," the court simply concluded that the test of causation was satisfied."7
Then, in Wollen v. DePaul Health Center,"' the Missouri Supreme
Court recharacterized its Jackson decision and apparently reinserted but-for
analysis into the causation-in-fact equation. The court announced that in
factor test is a cause in fact." Id. at 669 n.6.
107. Id. (emphasis original).
108. Id. at 672 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 673-74 (Welliver, J., dissenting). The questions of duty and proximate
cause are really one in the same. KEETON ET AL., supra note 46, at 274.
110. Jackson, 708 S.W.2d at 676-77 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
111. Pollard v. Ashby, 793 S.W.2d 394, 409 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (Smith, J.,
dissenting). See Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 861.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 116, 166-69.
113. 805 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (Western District).
114. Iad. at 228. Notice the similarity in reasoning with Jackson. See supra note
105 and accompanying text.
115. 753 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. 1988).
116. Id. at 563.
117. Id.
118. 828 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Mo. 1992).
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Jackson, it "considered situations where, while cause could not absolutely be
proven, it [was] 'more likely than not' that 'but for' the negligence of the tort-
feasors the injury would not have occurred.""1 9 Since the plaintiff in Wollen
could only allege that the defendants' negligence might have contributed to
decedent's death, this negligence could not be a substantial factor.12
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hospital, the Missouri Supreme Court
began its analysis of the causation requirement with a question: Does
Missouri law still include a but-for test, and, if so, when does the test
apply?' The court recognized that confusion about the answer to this
question had arisen since the advent of the substantial factor test.1
2
Tracing the roots of this confusion, the court identified several reasons
for the decline of the but-for test.123 First, the court noted the substantial
factor test has become popular among lawyers and judges because, using such
a test, it becomes easier to communicate the idea of multiple causes.
12 4
Second, decisions sach as Jackson v. Ray Kruse Construction Co.,
125
intimated that the substantial factor test does not include but-for analysis.
2 6
Finally, the court opined that the confusion regarding when, and if, to use the
but-for test largely stems from the different meanings of substantial factor
employed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts and Prosser."
The court noted that section 432 of the Restatement (Second) mandates
that conduct is not a substantial factor unless it meets the but-for test, a
requirement in every situation except the narrow, two fires type case.
2 1
Thus, the court found that confusion initially arose because, while all cases
require substantial factor testing under the Restatement, the vast majority are
119. Id. at 683. Recall that but-for language does not appear in the Jackson
opinion. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
120. Id. Note that the reason why the plaintiff in Wollen could only allege that
the defendant's negligence may have contributed to the death was that this case
involved a cause of action for loss of chance. For comprehensive coverage of loss of
chance in Missouri, see Robert S. Bruer, Note, Loss of a Chance as a Cause ofAction
in Medical Malpractice Cases, 59 Mo. L. REV. 969 (1994).
121. Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 860.
122. Id. at 861.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 708 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. 1986).
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still required to meet the but-for test as well.129 The court noted that
Prosser's approach differs from the Restatement in that a but-for test must be
met in all cases except the two fires situation.3 i the two fires situation,
the substantial factor test applies.' Comparing the two approaches, the
court concluded that when Prosser refers to a substantial factor case, he refers
only to a two fires case.'32 On the other hand, when the Restatement refers
to a substantial factor case, it is referring to all cases, including the two fires
scenario."'
Having investigated the problem, the court warned that confusing the
approaches of the Restatement and Prosser could, by eliminating the use of the
but-for test, "fritterfl away a meaningful causation test" to the point where
causation-in-fact would no longer be required."3 The court stated that "'but
for' is an absolute minimum for causation because it is merely causation in
fact."'35 Attempting to impose liability on a defendant, absent a showing of
actual causation, attempts to connect the defendant with an injury that he did
not produce.'36
Addressing lawyers and judges who have found the but-for test difficult
to apply, the court asserted that multiple causes can be tested easily with the
but-for causation test.'37  After testing this assertion against several






134. Id. This statementmay be an exaggeration. Boththe Restatement approach
and Prosser's approach utilize a but-for test. The danger lies in courts using
Restatement substantial factor language without understanding that such a test includes
but for analysis. See supra text accompanying note 86.
135. Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 862.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. The court illustrated the use of but-for withthe following hypotheticals. The
court stated that if Dr. Venglareik knew of Danny's presence at the hospital and knew
of his condition, but either failed to see Danny or failed to drain the abscess, then his
negligent conduct would meet the but-for test. Id. "If nurse Schwartz failed to inform
Dr. Venglarcik of Danny's presence and condition.., and the doctor had no other
source of this infonnation," the nurse's conduct would also satisfy the but-for test. Id.
Finally, if the doctor had another source of information about Danny's presence and
condition and if the nurse failed to inform the doctor, the nurse's conduct would fail
to meet the but-for test, "absent a convincing policy argument that this situation should
be treated as a 'two fires' case." Id.
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but-for test is not inconsistent with multiple causal circumstances.' 39 The
court stated that whether or not one defendant meets or does not meet the
but-for test has no effect on the remaining defendants. 4 Individual
defendants "rise or fall on their own 'but-for' causation test.' 1
41
Finally, answering its initial question, the court held that the but-for test
for causation applies in all cases, except two fires cases. 42 Examining the
facts of the case, the court noted that the plaintiff's experts testified that if the
abscess had been treated properly, Danny's immune system would not have
been suppressed, and Danny would not have developed paralytic polio.
143
Taking this testimony in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court
concluded that causation was a question for the jury, and the jury believed that
the plaintiff would not be paralyzed but for the actions of St. Louis University
and Cardinal Glennon 1 44 Therefore, the court denied St. Louis University's
point of error asserting the plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence
of causation.'45
V. COMMENT
The decision in Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hospital can be viewed
in at least three ways. First, Callahan can be seen simply as a correction of
Jackson v. Ray Kruse Construction Co., which courts interpreted as
eliminating the but-for test from causation analysis. Second, Callahan
indicates a shift in the Missouri Supreme Court's allocation of functions
between judge and jury. Finally, the decision reflects a change in the court's





142. Id. at 862-63.
143. Id. at 864.
144. Id. at 864-65.
145. Id. at 865.
146. In addition to these effects of Callahan, there should be minor changes in
trial procedure. The terminology employed by courts will have no impact on jury
instructions. The Missouri Approved Instructions (MA) deals with causation by
instructing that the defendant's conduct must "directly cause" or "directly contribute
to cause" plaintiff s injury. MAI 19.01 (1986). Thus, there will be no need to change
substantial factor language to but-for language. However, the change from substantial
factor to but-for could affect closing arguments. Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 863.
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A. Application of Callahan
Before examining the practical and theoretical impacts of Callahan, its
application can be observed in a later case, Washington v. Barnes
Hospital.14 In Washington, the plaintiff went to Barnes Hospital after
experiencing abdominal pain associated with her pregnancy.148 Upon her
arrival, a nurse examined the plaintiff and noted that the plaintiff had a firm
uterus, which usually indicates an abrption.149 After several ultrasounds
and signs of fetal distress, physicians performed an emergency Caesarian
section, resulting in delivery of twins. 5 ' However, one of the twins had
experienced a total abruption, producing permanent brain damage."' The
plaintiff alleged that the defendants were negligent in failing to diagnose the
abruption and perform the Caesarian section in a more timely fashion, causing
damage to the child."'
Applying the Callahan but-for test, the court found that in order to
establish causation, the plaintiff had to show that, but for the defendant's
negligence, the child would have been delivered before the abruption, thus
sparing him from oxygen deprivation."' The majority stated that, at most,
one could say that an earlier delivery "might or might not have made any
difference."5 4  Thus, the court concluded, the evidence presented by the
plaintiff's experts was insufficient to satisfy the but-for test. 5
Under the Jackson regime, the evidence presented in Washington may
very well have been sufficient to reach the jury on the issue of causation. 56
As the court stated in Jackson, the jury "could have believed a speed
147. No. 93-62364, 1993 WL 478944 (Mo. Ct. App. November 23, 1993).
148. Id. at *2.
149. Id. ('An abruption is a separation of the placenta from the wall of the uterus.
A complete abruption deprives the baby of its source of oxygen while in the uterus.").
Id. at *2 n.1.
150. Id. at *3.
151. Id.
152. Id. at *4.
153. Id. at *7.
154. Id. at *8.
155. Id. The court reversed the judgment in favor of the defendant. The dissent
believed that the evid nce of causation was sufficient to let the jury decide the issue.
Id. at *10.
156. See Dale C. Doerhoff, Supreme CourtAdopts "But For" Causation Rule and
OtherRecentDevelopmentsin Missouri Cases,50 J. Mo. Bar. 5 (1994) (analyzing the
Washington decision and stating that "before Callahan, any proximately related causal
event was arguably a substantial factor.").
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bump .. could have greatly reduced the chance of an accident .... 057
Applying this standard in Washington, the court might have concluded that the
jury could have believed that an earlier Caesarian section could have reduced
the chance of oxygen deprivation.15 Thus, the causation question belonged
to the jury."" However, in Washington, the but-for test performed its
function and resulted in dismissal of an action against a defendant whose
conduct was not "determinative of the outcome;""16 under the uncertain,
speculative causation approach in Jackson, the result may have been different.
161
157. Jackson v. Ray Kruse Constr. Co., 708 S.W.2d 644, 668 (Mo. 1986)
(emphasis added).
158. Washington, 1993 WL 478944 at *8.
159. Id.
160. See Doerhoff, supra note 157, at ** (stating that "in most cases the 'but for'
test excuses conduct which is not determinative of outcome").
161. For an interesting application of the Callahan but for test to a punitive
damages claim, see Vaughn v. North American Systems, Inc., 869 S.W.2d 757 (Mo.
1994). The Vaughn court held that the plaintiffs punitive damage claim failed
because the but-for test was not satisfied. Id. at 759-60.
In Vaughn, the plaintiff brought a products liability action against the defendant,
the manufacturer of Mr. Coffeemaker. She claimed that her Mr. Coffeemaker started
a fire in her home and caused property damage. Id. at 758. Her coffeemaker had an
electric clock that would only function while the unit was plugged in, and it also came
with instructions to unplug the coffeemaker when not in use. Id. The coffeemaker
could be switched off and remain plugged in, thereby allowing the clock to run
continuously. Id. at 759.
On May 16, 1986, the plaintiff turned her coffeemaker on, filled it with vinegar
to clean it, and left the coffeemaker on while she took a shower. Id. at 758.
Unattended, the coffeemaker started a fire which damaged the plaintiffs home. Id,
The jury awarded the plaintiff $15,000 in actual damages. Id.
For her punitive damages claim, the plaintiff pointed out the contradictory
messages of the defendant. Id. at 758-59. On the one hand, the coffeemaker
instructionswamed that, for fire safety reasons, users shouldunplug their coffeemakers
when not in use. Id. at 758. On the other hand, the presence of a clock which only
functions when the coffeemaker is plugged in encourages users to keep their
coffeemakers plugged in while not in use; and constitutes a "trap for the unwary." Id.
at 759.
However, as the court correctly concludes, this plaintiff did not fall into this trap.
Id. The plaintiff "did not leave the coffeemaker switched off and plugged in." Id.
Rather, she "left the coffemaker switched on while cleaning it with vinegar." Id. The
court found that "ft]he fact that this coffeemaker was equipped with an electric clock
is irrelevant to the occurrence of this fire. It could have no causal relationship in fact."
Id. Prior Missouri decisions have required that punitive damages "have some
reasonable relation to the injury inflicted and the cause thereof'" Id. However, after
discussing this standard, the Vaughn court cited Callahan stating that the but for test
[Vol. 59
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B. The First Impact of Callahan: Dispelling Confusion
With its decision in Jackson v. Ray Kruse Construction Co., the Missouri
Supreme Court thoroughly confused itself and other Missouri courts.
Although the court in Jackson did not explicitly state that but-for testing no
longer applied in determining causation-in-fact, the opinion leaves one
wondering exactly what the court intended to do.
The court failed to use but-for language and used very equivocal wording
when stating the bases for the causal connection in the case. Then, after
stating that " [t]he law deals with probabilities," the court concluded by finding
its opinion "consistent with Missouri cases applying the 'substantial factor' test
of causation."'62 In a footnote the court listed the Missouri cases dealing
with the substantial factor rule; however, each of the cases cited includes a
but-for test in its substantial factor analysis. 63 In the same footnote, the
court referred the reader to Restatement (Second) of Torts section 431
substantial factor test."M However, the court failed to cite section 432,
which explicitly incorporates but-for analysis into the Restatement substantial
factor test.'65 Based on this analysis, there is little wonder that numerous
is "an absolute minimum for causation." Id. Finding that the plaintiff's punitive
damages claim did not satisfy the but-for test, the court affirmed the trial court's denial
of punitive damages relief. Id. at 759-60.
Considering the facts of this case, the use of the but-for test has both an analytic
and common sense appeal. What the plaintiff was using as her basis for punitive
damages (i.e., the presence of an electric clock on the coffeemaker) had absolutely
nothing to do with how the accident occurred in this case. But for the presence of the
clock, this accident would still have happened in the same fashion. However,
application of the but-for test to a punitive damages claim seems theoretically flawed.
Simply put, punitive damages are not caused by anything. It seems odd to inquire
whether but for the actions of defendant, plaintiff would have suffered punitive
damages. In the final analysis, for the sake of definitional clarity, it may have been
wise for the court to utilize the "reasonable relation" standard as opposed to but-for.
162. Jackson, 708 S.W.2d at 668-69.
163. Id. at 669 n.6. See also Todd v. Watson, 501 S.W.2d 48, 52 (Mo. 1973);
Ricketts v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 484 S.W.2d 216, 222 (Mo. 1972);
Champieux v. Miller, 255 S.W.2d 794, 797 (Mo. 1953); Stumpf v. Panhandle E.
Pipeline Co., 189 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Mo. 1945); and Giles v. Moundridge Milling Co.,
173 S.W.2d 745, 750 (Mo. 1943).
164. Jackson, 708 S.W.2d at 669 n.6.
165. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. See also RESTATMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(1) (1965). Prosser identifies three distinct and conflicting
meanings of the term "substantial factor:" (1) some courts use it to refer solely to a
two fires type case; (2) some courts use the substantial factor test as a synonym for
proximate cause; (3) other courts use substantial factor as a substitute for but for
testing, which he calls a "blending" of but for and the requirement of proof. KEETON
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courts interpreted the opinion in Jackson as completely eliminating the but-for
requirement.
66
The confusion of Jackson is exemplified by the appellate court opinion
in Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hospital. The Eastern District of the
Missouri Court of Appeals, citing Jackson, stated a cause is legally sufficient
if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and "[a] cause which
meets the substantial factor test is a cause in fact." 67 In addition, the court
announced it "[found] nothing . . . that suggests the substantial factor test
should be replaced by the 'but for' test on medical causation issues." '168
This latter statement demonstrates a misunderstanding of cause-in-facttesting.
The Restatement substantial factor test, which Missouri adopted, includes the
"but for" test as a component. 69 The suggestion that these two tests are
mutually exclusive is wholly incorrect.'
In Callahan, the Missouri Supreme Court dispelled the confusion and
misinterpretation surrounding cause-in-fact analysis."' After this decision,
there will be no question as to when to use the but-for and substantial factor
tests.
C. The Second Impact of Callahan: Reallocation of
Judge and Jury Functions
As Judge Welliver recognized in his dissent in Jackson, the court had
effectively "abdicate[d] the judicial function of deciding as a matter of law
whether the case should have been submitted to the jury."'7  Also
dissenting, Judge Donnelly declared that the majority "neuters the much-used
ET AL., supra note 46, at 268.
The court in Jackson seems to have accomplished, as Prosser stated, a blending
of the substantive but for requirement with the requirement of proof, preponderance
of evidence. As Prosser predicted, using such a test "leads often to confusion." See
KEETON ET AL., supra note 46, at 264.
166. See, eg., cases cited and discussedin notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
167. Callahanv. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., No. 60685, 1992 WL 251555, at *5
(Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1992) (quoting Jackson, 708 S.W.2d at 669 n.6).
168. Id. at *6.
169. See supranote 86 and accompanying text; See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 432(1) (1965).
170. In prior decisions of the Eastern District, the court utilized a but for test.
See, e.g., Delisi v. St. Luke's Episcopal-Presbyterian Hosp., 701 S.W.2d 170, 175
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Robbins v. Jewish Hosp., 663 S.W.2d 341, 345 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984).
171. Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 861.
172. Jackson, 708 S.W.2d at 672 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
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concept that it is the duty of a trial court to direct a verdict for the defendant
where causation is a matter of pure speculation and conjecture."'" After
Jackson, almost all questions of causation were to go to the jury, and motions
for summary judgment and directed verdict on the issue of causation would
nearly always fail.
By reinstating the but-for test, the Callahan court reallocated the
functions of judge and jury. On motions for summary judgment and directed
verdict, the trial court now has a clear test to apply. If the pleadings or
evidence fail to demonstrate that the defendant's conduct in question was
determinative of the plaintiff's harm, the defendant's motion should be
sustained.'
D. The Third Impact of Callahan: Changing Theories
of Tort Compensation
Viewing Callahan more broadly, the Missouri Supreme Court, deviated
from a line of 1980s tort cases,' characterized by Judge Welliver as
elevating the need for compensation as the primary function of the law of torts
173. Id. at 671 (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
174. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 46, § 45 (Functions of Court and Jury).
175. See Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., 715 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Mo. 1986) (holding
that plaintiff s comparative fault is not an issue in a products liability claim); Jackson
v. Ray Kruse Constr. Co., 708 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. 1986); Nesseirode v. Executive
Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986); Firestone v. Crown Center
Redevelopment, 693 S.W.2d 99, 110 (Mo. 1985) (abolishing the doctrine of remittitur
in Missouri); Chandra v. Sprinkle, 678 S.W.2d 804, 808 (Mo. 1984) (holding that no
privilege from discovery exists under Missouri law for factual statements made during
peer review of a doctor); Fowler v. Park Corp., 673 S.W.2d 749, 754 (Mo. 1984)
(concluding that defendant had a duty to ensure that the one to whom he entrusts his
chattel is competent to operate it and that defendant must inquire as to the entrustee's
competence); Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. 1984); Johnsonv.
Pacific Int'l Express Co., 662 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. 1983); O'Grady v. Brown, 654
S.W.2d 904, 911 (Mo. 1983) (holding that Missouri's wrongful death statute "does
provide a cause of action for the wrongful death of a viable fetus"); Wynnv. Navajo
Freight Lines, 654 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. 1983); Virginia D. v. Madesco Inv. Corp., 648
S.W.2d 881 (Mo. 1983); Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Serv., 646 S.W.2d 781, 785
(Mo. 1983) (construing the term "accident" in Missouri's Workers Compensation
statute to include any job related injury); Bassv. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d765, 772-73
(Mo. 1983) (abandoning the impact rule and permitting recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress if: "(1) the defendant should have realized that his
conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress; and (2) the emotional
distress or mental injury must be medically diagnostic and must be of sufficient
severity so as to be medically significant").
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in Missouri. '76 Judge Welliver described these cases and this decade in tort
law as the advent of what "M.A.T.A. [Missouri Association of Trial
Attorneys] thought to be the coming of the Great society, and others, thought
to be this Court's contribution to the Tort Crisis.
177
If Judge Welliver's characterization is accurate, he would welcome
Callahan as a positive step in delivering Missouri from "the Sargasso Sea of
the crisis of tort," by reinstating the but-for test."8 By doing so, the court
halted the trend interpreting Jackson to ease a plaintiff's burden on the issue
of causation-in-fact. 179 A plaintiff must, at minimum, satisfy the but-for test
in order to recover against a defendant. 8 ' By retaining this minimal hurdle,
the court stopped the decline in the application of cause-in-fact analysis.'81
The decision in Callahan responds to the fears expressed by Judge
Welliver in Jackson. Tort recovery requires but-for compensation. Only then
may the plaintiff be compensated. Thus, in deciding Callahan the court
moved away from the theory that the primary function of tort law is to serve
the need of compensation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hospital, the Missouri Supreme Court
clarified cause-in-fact analysis in Missouri. Recognizing prior confusion, the
court clearly asserted that the but-for test shall be utilized in all tort cases
except the narrow two fires situation. The repercussions of Callahan extend
well beyond mere clarification of the law of cause-in-fact. In effect, the court
altered the allocation of functions between the trial court and the jury, and
signalled a perceptible change in its overall theory of tort compensation.
CHRISTOPHER M. HOHN
176. Jackson, 708 S.W.2d at 671 (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
177. Lippard, 715 S.W.2d at 505 (Welliver, J., dissenting) (from what Judge
Welliver titled as the "Epilogue-to Gustafson").
178. Id.
179. See Pollard, 793 S.W.2d at 409 (Smith, J., dissenting).
180. Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 862.
181. Id. at 861.
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